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SUPREME VERBOSITY: THE ROBERTS
&2857¶6(;3$1',1*/(GACY
MEG PENROSE*
The link between courts and the public is the written word. With rare
exceptions, it is through judicial opinions that courts communicate with
litigants, lawyers, other courts, and the community. Whatever the court’s
statutory and constitutional status, the written word, in the end, is the source
and the measure of the court’s authority.
It is therefore not enough that a decision be correct—it must also be fair
and reasonable and readily understood. The burden of the judicial opinion is
to explain and to persuade and to satisfy the world that the decision is
principled and sound. What the court says, and how it says it, is as important
as what the court decides. It is important to the reader. But it is also important
to the author because in the writing lies the test of the thinking that underlies
it. “Good writing,” Ambrose Bierce said, “essentially is clear thinking made
visible.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION±THE WRITTEN WORD
:RUGVPDWWHU-XVWDVN%U\DQ*DUQHUWKHFRXQWU\¶Vlegal lexicographer.2
Or, former Circuit Judge, Ruggero J. Aldisert, an authority on judicial
opinions.3 Or, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the organization that publishes
the Judicial Writing Manual: A Pocket Guide for Judges.4 Or, better yet, ask
the current justices. With the exception of newly appointed Justice Neil
Gorsuch, the remaining justices are on record as opposing unnecessarily long
writing.5 Despite an oft-fractured Court, the justices are unanimous in their
desire for concise legal writing. Yet, these same justices are responsible for
some of the lengthiest opinions in Supreme Court history.6 While past opinions
were regularly communicated in short order²often by a single justice²the
Roberts Court regularly issues lengthy, seriatim opinions. Further, the current
2. BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH (2d ed. 2001). Professor Garner
believes that ³it¶s impossible to separate good writing from clear thinking.´ Bryan A. Garner, Preface
to LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH, at xiii (2d ed. 2001).
3. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING (Carolina Acad. Word Press, 3d ed. 2012).
4. See SCHWARZER, supra note 1, at vii. In the First Edition¶s Foreword, William W Schwarzer,
then Director Emeritus of the Federal Judicial Center, explained:
To serve the cause of good opinion writing, the Federal Judicial Center has
prepared this manual. It is not held out as an authoritative pronouncement on
good writing, a subject on which the literature abounds. Rather, it distills the
experience and reflects the views of a group of experienced judges, vetted by a
distinguished board of editors. No one of them would approach the task of
writing an opinion, or describe the process, precisely as any of the others would.
Yet, though this is a highly personal endeavor, some generally accepted principles
of good opinion writing emerge and they are the subject of this manual. We hope
that judges and their law clerks will find this manual helpful and that it will
advance the cause for which it has been prepared.
Id. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has this, and many other excellent writing resources, available
online for free. FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/subject/opinion-writing-legal-writing
[https://perma.cc/JGN9-C87R] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
5. See Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices, 13 SCRIBES J.
LEG. WRITING (2010) (including interviews with Justices Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito). Professor Garner interviewed Justices Sotomayor and Kagan after their
appointments; see also Mary Margaret Penrose, To Say What the Law Is Succinctly, 51 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).
6. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (50,870 words); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (67,053 words). Ironically, McDonald was a simple
incorporation case. McDonald held that the Second Amendment was incorporated via the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply to the states and their subdivisions. Id. at 778. It is curious to imagine this limited
holding would necessitate 17,000 more words than the more difficult substantive decision of whether
the Second Amendment provided an individual right to possess an operable handgun in the home for
self-protection, the topic of Heller.
*The word count includes footnotes, internal case citations and all opinions²majority, concurrences,
and dissents. The author opted for this fuller word count as it represents the justiceV¶ true output.
Further, readers are expected to consume the entire opinion.
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justices frequently render individualized positions in cases without adding
SUHFHGHQWLDO YDOXH  7KH\ GHULGH ODZ\HUV¶ YHUERVH ZULWLQJ ZKLOH SD\LQJ
inadequate attention to their own writing.7 If words matter, SKRXOGQ¶WZRUGV
matter in all legal writing?
Just as words matter, writing matters. As Judge Re, writing for the FJC
noted, there is a difference between good legal writing and poor legal writing.8
7KHTXHVWLRQEHFRPHVZKHWKHUWKHHQGSURGXFWUHSUHVHQWVRQH¶V³EHVWHIIRUW´9
The Roberts Court needs to return to good legal writing by improving their
efforts²both at writing and editing. Opinions are too long, too confusing, and
are becoming increasingly inaccessible. The solution lies in returning to the
basics²the ABCs.
II. BACK TO BASICS±SETTING THE EXAMPLE
[T]he purpose of all legal writing is persuasion. . . . Similarly,
the purpose of a judicial opinion is to convince any reader that
sound logic supports the court’s decision. . . . Excessive
citation, excessive footnoting and excessive pedantry . . . run[]
against your sole purpose: to sell your argument to your
readers.10
The three pillars of good legal writing are accuracy, brevity, and clarity.11
Accuracy is the foundation. Without accuracy, the entire brief, memorandum,
or judicial opinion becomes suspect. If a legal writer cannot get the facts (or
law) straight, chances are the rest of the document is equally flawed. Brevity
and clarity, meanwhile, go hand in hand. Brevity helps accomplish clarity by
avoiding unnecessary topics, eliminating adjectives and adverbs, and
minimizing verbal clutter. Brevity does not automatically ensure clarity. But,
clarity is more apparent in concise writing than in lengthy documents filled with
endless footnotes or judicial opinions filled with unnecessary dicta. Good legal
writing is easy to spot. But in modern Supreme Court opinions, the ABCs of
good legal writing are becoming harder to find.

7. Gerald Lebovits, Short Judicial Opinions: The Weight of Authority, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (2004)
³Some judges who lament that lawyers¶ papers are too lengthy are more guilty of overwriting than
lawyers.´ 
8. Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, U.S. Custom Court, Appellate Opinion Writing, Federal Judicial
Center 1 (Mar. 11, 1975).
9. Id.
10. ALDISERT, supra note 3, at 118.
11. Re, supra note 8, at 2±7.
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They are not only professional writers. They are the legal voice for our
country. They set the example. Their cases become the training tools for all
future lawyers. Their writing serves as the example to law students of how to
³WKLQNOLNHDODZ\HU´3HUVRQDOLQYHFWLYHVRELWHUGLFWXPKLGGHQVWDQGards of
review, and unclear analysis appearing in Supreme Court opinions serve as
training tools. If this is how the Supreme Court operates, it must be how the
legal profession operates. If this is how the justices write, this must be how
lawyers write.
But, alas. The justices tell us we, the lawyers, are failing.12 They
unanimously agree that our briefs are too long. They explain that just the sight
of a lengthy brief yields a heavy sigh.13 Did the brief really need to be this
long? Ironically, lawyHUV KDYH WKH VDPH UHDFWLRQ WR WKH MXVWLFHV¶ ZULWLQJ
Lengthy opinions are met with a heavy sigh. And, an unclear opinion is met
with increased expenses for our clients²something the justices never face. Do
the justices, whose reading tastes reject lengthy and unclear writing, forget what
LW¶VOLNHWREHDUHDGHUZKHQLW¶VWKHLUWXUQWRZULWH":K\DUHWKHMXVWLFHVQRW
doing better in their own legal writing? We may be failing. But so are they.
This article challenges the justices, and those working LQMXGJHV¶FKDPEHUV
to work as hard on their legal writing as they do in rendering their decisions.14
-XGJHV DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU ³VD\LQJ ZKDW WKH ODZ LV´ They must do so in a
manner that is clear and understandable. After all, ignorance of the law is no
excuse. When complex writing and unnecessary secondary opinions work to
confuse even skilled legal readers, there is a problem. The justices must do
something to correct their growing problem²lengthy, confusing opinions. The
Roberts Court is quickly becoming the most verbose Supreme Court in history,
and iW¶VWLPHIRUFKDQJH
This article offers a solution. Supreme Court opinions should abide by the
Supreme Court Rules²in length and format. Those rules govern the conduct
of litigants before the Court6KRXOGQ¶WWKHMXVWLFHVEHDEOHWRFRQIRUPWKHLU
writing to the same standards? Opinion length can be governed by the same
UXOHV DV SHWLWLRQV IRU FHUWLRUDUL DQG EULHIV  $IWHU DOO WKH &RXUW¶V RSLQLRQ LV
written after briefing concludes and, in many cases, following oral argument.
Unlike practicing lawyers, the Court need not survey the universe of case law
or write on a blank slate. The issues have already been focused, case law
presented, and relevant authority cited. Opinion content can be governed by
12. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 64.
13. See id.
14. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2d
ed. 2013) (³>7]he purpose of the manual is to stimulate judges to think as systematically about writing
their opinions as they do about deciding their cases´).
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the same rules as petitions for certiorari, with clarity demanded for questions
presented, constitutional provisions and statutes relied upon, a statement of the
FDVH DQG D ³GLUHFW DQG FRQFLVH DUJXPHQW DPSOLI\LQJ WKH UHDVRQV´ IRU WKH
decision.15 And, opinions exceeding 1,500 words should contain a table of
contents and authorities.16
Were the justices required to adhere to the Supreme Court Rules, their
opinions would improve. 7KH UXOHV JRYHUQLQJ OLWLJDQWV¶ EULHILQJ GHPDQG
accuracy, brevity, DQGFODULW\)HZUHDOL]HWKDWWKH³IDLOXUHRIDSHWLWLRQHUWR
present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to ready and
adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration is sufficient
reason for the Court to deny a petitioQ>IRUFHUWLRUDUL@´17 In other words, the
Court can deny a petition for certiorari literally for poor legal writing.18 Maybe
LWLVWLPHIRUWKHMXVWLFHVWROLYHE\WKHVHVDPHVWDQGDUGV7DVNHGZLWK³VD\LQJ
ZKDWWKHODZLV´FDUULHVDUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRVD\ what the law is clearly. The time
has come for the justices to set the example.
III. FROM JOHN MARSHALL TO JOHN ROBERTS±A FLOOD OF WORDS
During Marshall’s thirty years as chief, “there weren’t
a lot of concurring opinions. There weren’t a lot of dissents.
And nowadays, you take a look at some of our opinions
and you wonder if we’re reverting back to the English model,
where everybody has to have their say. It’s more being
concerned with the jurisprudence of the individual
rather than working toward a jurisprudence of the Court.”19
John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States20

15. SUP. CT. R. 14.1(h).
16. SUP. CT. R. 14.1(c). ³If the petition prepared under Rule 33.1 exceeds 1,500 words or
exceeds five pages if prepared under Rule 33.2, a table of contents and a table of cited authorities. The
table of contents shall include the items contained in the appendix.´  see also SUP. CT. R. 24(c)
(imposing same rule for Briefs).
17. SUP. CT. R. 14.4.
18. See id.
19. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 106±07.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (presenting the official title of the Chief Justice). The statute states:
³The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight
associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.´ Id. The Chief Justice has not been
called the ³Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States´ since 1866. Chief Justice Salmon
Chase urged a bill to change the justices¶ Circuit riding duties that, incidentally, also changed the Chief
Justice¶s official title. Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 205 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1); see also
William Hornbeck, http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-online/whats-name-chiefjustices-official-title (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
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There have been seventeen Chief Justices of the United State of America.21
Courts, both in their successes and failures, are often referred to under the
Chief¶VQDPH7KXVWKH³0DUVKDOO&RXUW´FRYHUVWKHSHULRGEHWZHHQDQG
1835.22 Chief Justice John Marshall, our fourth Chief, drafted several of the
&RXUW¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQV Speaking for the Court, he did so clearly
and succinctly.23 Marshall eOLPLQDWHGWKH&RXUW¶VHDUO\WUDGLWLRQRIseriatim (or,
individually authored) opinions.24 This presented a unified Court at a time
when the Court needed to enhance its institutional standing.25 The current
&KLHI-XVWLFH5REHUWVEHOLHYHV³WKHPRVWVXFFHVVful chief justices help their
FROOHDJXHV VSHDN ZLWK RQH YRLFH´26 Marshall certainly accomplished this.
And, he did so without unnecessary elaboration.
Marshall Court opinions were often brief but powerful.27 There were
outliers, of course. Marbury v. Madison, for example, established judicial
review in 9,500 words.28 McCulloch v. Maryland upheld the federal
JRYHUQPHQW¶V DXWKRULW\ WR FUHDWH D QDWLRQDO EDQN XVLQJ WKH ³QHFHVVDU\ DQG
SURSHU´FODXVHLQURXJKO\ZRUGV29 But, those were atypical cases. And,
despite their length, they were clearly written.
³7RGD\PRVW6XSUHPH&RXUWRSLQLRQVDUHLQFRPSUHKHQVLEOHWRWKHJHQHUDO
SXEOLF7KLVLVGXHLQODUJHPHDVXUHWRWKHODQJXDJHWKDWLVXVHG´30 Length is
DQHTXDOFRQFHUQ³:KLOHODFNRIVLPSOLFLW\ in the choice of words is a major
fault of present Supreme Court opinions, length is of comparable importance.
Many opinions are composed of a flood of words. The sheer volume constitutes
a verbal curtain to communication even to the professional readers,´LQFOXGLQJ
Constitutional Law professors.31
21. Justices
1789
to
Present,
SUP.
CT.
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/BE7L-86SF] (last visited
Mar. 12, 2018).
22. Id.
23. See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: “The First Hundred Years Were the
Hardest”, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 481 (1988).
24. Id. at 480±81.
25. Id.
26. Rosen, supra note 19, at 105.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801) (806 words); Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (158 words); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829)
(1,013 words).
28. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
29. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). And, unlike modern cases, McCulloch was argued over the course of
nine separate days.
30. Ray Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions – Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173 (1995).
31. Id. at 175.

2018]

SUPREME VERBOSITY

173

$V &KLHI -XVWLFH :LOOLDP 5HKQTXLVW 5REHUWV¶s immediate predecessor,
noted:
6XUHO\RQHRI0DUVKDOO¶VJUHDWDELOLWLHVWKDW contributed to his
preeminence was his ability to explain clearly and forcefully
why the Court reached the conclusions it did. Marshall had the
power of clear, logical exposition . . . and his opinions reflect
it. They are a breath of fresh air, given that they were written
at the time when English and American legal writing was often
shrouded in fog.32
0DUVKDOO¶V HFRQRPLF XVH RI ODQJXDJH FRQWUDVWV HDVLO\ ZLWK WKH 5REHUWV
Court. By 2010, just five years into his tenure, Roberts presided over the most
prolix Supreme Court in history.33 In fact, the New York Times reported in
2010 that the Roberts Court had issued four of the ten lengthiest opinions ever.34
7KLVUHSRUWKRZHYHUIDLOVWRDFFRXQWIRUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VPRVWLQIDPRXV
decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford, which spans over 110,000 words.35 While
0DUVKDOO¶Vthirty-four year tenure as Chief resulted in numerous seminal cases,
many of which are still taught and relied upon today, Roberts is accomplishing
something Marshall never did²supreme verbosity. And, despite his
preference for a more unified Court, Roberts presides over one of the most
divided, and divisive, Supreme Courts.
If the present Court adopted the Marshall method of working
out a compromise, as the legislature does, before announcing
its new law with one voice, the law would become more clear,
more succinct, more verbally and logically consistent, and
more predictable. This would increase public understanding
DQGDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH&RXUW¶VYDVWSRZHUDQGLWZRXOGIRUWLI\
the all-important Rule of Law.36
IV. BY THE NUMBERS: A GROWING PROBLEM
[T]he weaknesses of legal writing have become increasingly obvious and,
more importantly, have spread to the most influential example of
American—the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.37

32.
33.
at A24.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 481.
Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010,
Id.
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
Forrester, supra note 30, at 179.
Id. at 167.
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Judicial opinions are becoming more voluminous and less luminous.38 This
grievance is not new.39 Lawyers have complained about judicial opinion
lengths for years.40 /LWHUDOO\(YHU\JHQHUDWLRQVHHPVWRODPHQWWKH³JRRGROG
GD\V´ZKHQFDVHVZHUHthree pages, or four pages or²gasp²six pages.41 Every
generation complains. Judges keep writing long opinions.42
In fairness, there was a physical cost to opinion length in the twentieth
century. Longer opinions meant more pages. More pages meant bigger
books.43 Bigger books cost more money. And, while this may seem foreign in
our digital age, lawyers from the 1800s through 1980 relied almost exclusively
on books.44 Before Westlaw, Lexis, and Google, longer cases impacted a law
ILUP¶V ERWWRP OLQH DV ODZ\HUV KDG WR NHHS SXUFKDVLQJ PRUH DQG PRUH OHJal
books to ensure they were current with the law.
Modernly, the issue is time and accessibility.
While law offices can now survive without subscriptions to the regional
reporters and the U.S. Reports, there is a time investment when judges write
lengthy opinions. And, for modern Americans who communicate using terser
language, lengthy opinions run counter to the cultural revolution of concision.
From Twitter, to Facebook, to Snapchat, individuals want their information
faster, clearer, and without much effort. While I am not suggesting the Court
XVHDPHUHFKDUDFWHUVWRUHVROYHRXUQDWLRQ¶VPRVWSUHVVLQJPDWWHUV,GR
think the justices can improve their current approach. Refusal to appreciate
EUHYLW\¶VYLUWXHFRVWVWKHOHJDOSURIHVVLRQWLPH$nd, lawyers still bill by the
hour.

38. Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (1988).
39. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 60.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 64 (comparing New York state opinions from the 1880s±1970s, which averaged
between 3.6 and 4.4 pages to the 1980 averages of 5.7 pages to the 1990s average of six pages). Federal
cases saw an even larger increase climbing from 2,863 average words in 1960 to 4,020 average words
in 1980. Id.
42. Mikva, supra note 38, at 1358.
43. Id. (comparing literal page lengths taken up in the printed reporters).
44. In a telling comment written in 1921, Chief Justice Winslow of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted:
The law library of the future staggers the imagination as one thinks of the
countless multitude of shelves that will stretch away in the dim distance, all
loaded with their many volumes of precious precedents; and as one thinks of the
intellectual giant that will be competent to retain a knowledge of them, as well as
the judge that must pass upon the principles involved, one must believe they need
be supermen, indeed.
James E. Markham, The Argument in the Decision, 6 A.B.A J. 270, 271 (1921) (quoting Justice
Winslow).
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Supreme Court opinions are increasingly accessible to the public through a
variety of platforms. Their mushrooming length, however, makes their true
accessibility a distant prospect. In 2005, the Roberts Court majority opinions
averaged just over 4,300 words.45 Five years later, the average length expanded
to around 5,000 words.46 6LQFHWKHQWKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQVKDYHFRQWLQXHGWR
grow, with recent majority opinions averaging over 8,000 words.47 This does
not include the growing number of²and length attributable to²concurring and
dissenting opinions. So, while Americans can freely obtain Court opinions on
numerous modern devices, it is unlikely this increased accessibility adds
understanding. In a perverse twist, as society moves towards more efficient
communication, the Court is issuing encyclopedic opinions rivaling great
literary works.
This disconnect becomes clear in the following chart. This chart provides
a page and average word count for all Roberts Court majority opinions from
2013 through 2017.48 In a telling move, the Harvard Law Review, which has
been keeping Supreme Court statistics since 2006, first began reporting opinion
length in 2013.49 8VLQJ WKH +DUYDUG PHWULFV LW LV HDV\ WR VHH WKH &RXUW¶V
growing problem, by the numbers.

45. Rosen, supra note 19, at 111.
46. Liptak, supra note 33, at A24.
47. See Table created by author using The Statistics, HARV. L. REV.,
https://harvardlawreview.org/category/statistics (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). The Statistics, which
keeps annual data regarding Supreme Court activity, is currently available for Supreme Court terms
2006±2017.
48. See Statistics, HARV. L. REV., https://harvardlawreview.org/category/statistics
[https://perma.cc/HM6M-FR7G] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). This author-created chart does not
include word counts for concurring and dissenting opinions. Information provided by The Statistics
does.
49. See +DUYDUG/DZ5HYLHZ$VV¶QThe Statistics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 408, 415 (2013). The
Statistics noted in 2013, ³[t]his is the first year that The Statistics has included data on opinion length.
Monitoring opinion length by Justice will likely be useful for tracking the writing habits of individual
Justices over time, as well as for comparing the writing habits of Justices in a given term.´ Id.
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Table:
P = Pages
W = Words
7KHZRUGFRXQWVSURYLGHGXVHERWKRI+DUYDUG¶VPHWULFV²the first number
estimates 560 words per page, the second number estimates 590 words per
page.50
Court Term Opinions Avg. Signed Maj. Opinion Avg. Including PC Opinions
2013

78

P: 15.2 W: 8,512±8,968

P: 14.3

W: 8,008±8,437

2014

72

P: 17.5 W: 9,800±10,325

P: 16.6

W: 9,296±9,794

2015

74

P: 15.2 W: 8,512±8,968

P: 14.3

W: 8,008±8,437

2016

75

P: 14.4 W: 8,064±8,496

P: 13.3

W: 7,448±7,847

2017

69

P: 13.7

P: 12.7

W: 7,112±7,793

W: 7,672±8,083

Looking at this chart, a few things become clear. First, the justices are
averaging seventy-four opinions per year. That number is far lower than earlier
courts that issued (a) shorter opinions, and (b) fewer individual concurring and
dissenting opinions. Second, the average majority opinion²meaning the
average length without considering individual concurring and dissenting
opinions²is 15.2 pages. Marbury v. Madison, in contrast, was nine pages.51
Third, the average word count has jumped considerably since 2010.52
There are four potential measurements to assess word count. But, under
any of the four, the increase is salient. If the lower estimate of 560 words per
page is used, then WKH&RXUW¶VDYHUDJHVLJQHGPDMRULW\RSLQLRQ ZKHUHD-XVWLFH
signs their name to the opinion) is 8,512 words. If the higher estimate of 590
ZRUGVSHUSDJHLVXVHGWKH&RXUW¶VDYHUDJHVLJQHGPDMRULW\RSLQLRQLV
words. If the lower estimate of 560 words per page is used against all the
&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQVLQFOXGLQJSHUFXULXPRSLQLRQV ZKHUHQR-XVWLFHVLJQVWKHLU
name to the opinion), the average majority opinion length is 7,974 words. If
the higher estimate of 590 words per page is used for all the &RXUW¶VRSLQLRQV
including per curium opinions, the average majority opinion length increases to
8,462 words.53

50. See id. ³A typical slip-opinion page contains approximately 560 to 590 words.´  To give
readers of this article a clear picture of the potential word counts, I have opted to use both numbers.
51. Forrester, supra note 30, at 182.
52. Liptak, supra note 33, at A24.
53. ,W¶V DOVR ZRUWK SRLQWLQJ RXW WKDW -XVWLFH 6FDOLD¶V GHDWK LQ  OLNHO\ LPSDFWHG ERWK WKH
&RXUW¶VZRUGFRXQWDQGWKH&RXUW¶VRXWSXWZKLOHDZDLWLQJDninth Justice. Unfortunately,
once Justice Gorsuch joined the Court, the 2018 numbers returned to the modern norm. At least nine
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The increases since 2010 are remarkable. Using the lower average for
signed opinions and higher average for all opinions, the current five-year
average appears to be majority opinions of 8,500 words. That number becomes
staggering when you add the average length of concurring and dissenting
RSLQLRQV$V*HUDOG/HERYLWVZULWHV³Concision is a virtue. Wordiness, not
complexity, creates long oSLQLRQV´54
6RPHWKLQJ PXVW FKDQJH  5REHUWV KLPVHOI QRWHG WKDW ³>L@I WKH &RXUW LQ
0DUVKDOO¶VHUDKDGLVVXHGGHFLVLRQVLQLPSRUWDQWFDVHVWKHZD\WKLV&RXUWKDV
over the past thirty years, we would not have a Supreme Court today of the sort
that we have, . . . wKDWWKH&RXUW¶VEHHQGRLQJRYHUWKHSDVWWKLUW\\HDUVKDV
been eroding, to some extent, the capital that Marshall built up. I think the
Court is also ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution, because
LILWGRHVQ¶WLW¶VJRLQJWRORVHLWVFUHGLELOLW\DQGOHJLWLPDF\DVDQLQVWLWXWLRQ´55
V. LAW AS LITERATURE? FROM SHORT STORIES TO BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS
[O]f the many mansions in the house of literature, law is not one.56
7R SXW WKH 5REHUWV &RXUW¶V YHUERVLW\ LQ FRQWH[W LW KHOSVWR FRPSDUH WKH
justices¶ writing to other written works. In 2010, the average majority opinion
was roughly 5,000 words.57 Today, those opinions have swollen to 8,500
words.58 In literary circles, this means the Roberts Court has shifted from
opinions rivaling short stories to opinions rivaling novellas. And, again, these
averages only count majority opinions²not the verbal multiplicity of
concurring and dissenting opinions.
Joe Hilland, of the Indiana Review, explained why most publishers limit
the length of a short story to 8,000 words or less:
,¶YHDOZD\VEHHQIRQGRI(GJDU$OOHQ 3RH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH
short story as a work of fiction that can be read in a single
sitting. I like that Poe defines the short story form largely by
IRFXVLQJRQWKHUHDGHU¶VLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKHWH[WDQG,OLNHWKDW
he places a time limit on this interaction²a single sitting.

cases surpass 20,000 words, including critical cases dealing with search and seizure, presidential
powers, and immigration.
54. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 64.
55. Rosen, supra note 19, at 105.
56. Felix Frankfurter, When Judge Cardozo Writes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1931, at 211.
57. Liptak, supra note 33, at A24.
58. See Table created by author using The Statistics, supra note 48. The Statistics, which keeps
annual data regarding Supreme Court activity, are currently available for Supreme Court terms 2006±
2017.
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I think most readers would agree that they begin a short
story with the understanding that, barring any outside
interruptions, WKH\ZRQ¶WQHHGDERRNPDUNWRJHWWRWKHHQG
For editors, however, the idea that a short story should be read
in a single sitting raises an important question: How long are
readers willing to sit with a story? Half an hour? An hour?
Three hours?
Like most literary journals, IR places a word limit on
fiction as part of our submissions guidelines. We accept stories
of up to 8,000 words, which is probably an average word limit,
UHODWLYH WR RWKHU $PHULFDQ MRXUQDOV RI RXU VL]H <RX¶OO ILQG
journals that cap their stories at 5,000 or 6,000 words, and
\RX¶OO ILQG VRPH MRXUQals that will accept stories as long as
10,000 words. Journals without word limits in their submission
guidelines for fiction are, in my experience, extremely rare.
Editors place word limits on fiction submissions partly as
a matter of practicality. Longer stories obviously take more
time to read, and few journals have staffs large enough to
handle slush piles filled with stories that ask readers to sit with
them for an hour or more. More importantly, longer stories take
up more space in the journal, space that could otherwise be
devoted to work from several other authors.59
Word count averages, as set forth above, tell some of the story. But, it helps
to put those numbers²and word counts²into other measurable contexts. I
have evaluated Supreme Court opinions in relation to books of the Bible and
other literary works. In this way, individuals visualizing the length of modern
judicial opinions have a reference beyond mere numbers.
MarshaOO¶V OHJDO PDVWHUSLHFH HVWDEOLVKLQJ MXGLFLDO UHYLHZ Marbury v.
Madison, was equivalent in length to the Biblical books of Revelation or
Proverbs60²RU +HUPDQ 0HOYLOOH¶V VKRUW VWRU\ Bartleby the Scrivener.61
Remarkably, Marbury¶VZRUGFRXQWVLWVMXVW above the Roberts Court¶V current
five-year average for majority opinions. The main difference between

59. Joe Hiland, When Is A Short Story Too Long?, IND. REV. (Feb. 11, 2013),
https://indianareview.org/2013/02/when-is-a-short-story-too-long/ [https://perma.cc/SHB2-K69P].
60. Jeffrey Kranz, Word Counts for Every Book of the Bible, OVERVIEWBIBLE (May 29, 2014),
https://overviewbible.com/word-counts-books-of-bible/ [https://perma.cc/5C4S-9UH9]; see also
Felix Just, New Testament Statistics, http://catholic-resources.org/Bible/NT-Statistics-Greek.htm
[https://perma.cc/XL73-GBBW] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
61. Word count available at https://www.readinglength.com/book/isbn-1466268778/
[https://perma.cc/87TH-QDSN] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
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0DUVKDOO¶VZULWLQJDQGWKH5REHUWV&RXUW¶VZULWLQJLVWKDWWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RI
Marshall Court decisions involved a single Court opinion.62
In contrast, the Roberts Court is increasingly displaying a return to the
seriatim approach of individually authored opinions. An illustration is National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Obamacare decision.63
When the various, individually authored opinions are added together, this one
opinion is 52,395 words. This gargantuan writing equates to reading the three
longest of the four Gospels (John, 15,635 words; Luke, 19,482 words; and,
Matthew, 18,346 words).64 That is quite a task when one considers that most
judicial opinions should be consumable in a single sitting.
The average Roberts Court majority opinion far exceeds forty of the sixtysix books in the Bible.65 In fact, in averaging 8,500 words per majority, Con
Law students are asked to invest²per average case²the equivalent of reading
Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, and first and second Thessalonians.66 The
5REHUWV&RXUW¶VDYHUDJHPDMRULW\RSLQLRQ²average²was the length of
the Book of Revelation.67 In fact, the 2014 average majority opinion was as
long as Marbury v. Madison.68 This growing problem compromises education
and comprehension.
These lengthy opinions rival great literary works. At 8,500 words, one can
UHDG ERWK 1DWKDQLDO +DZWKRUQH¶V The Ambitious Guest (3,343 words) and
Young Goodman Brown (5,387 words) in the same time it takes to read the
average Roberts Court majority opinion.69 The average majority opinion is a
full 1,300 words²or a litWOHPRUHWKDQWKHOHQJWKRI.DWH&KRSLQ¶VThe Hour
(1,009)²ORQJHU WKDQ (GJDU $OODQ 3RH¶V The Fall of the House of Usher
(7,226).70

62. See Mikva, supra note 38, at 1359 (explaining the growing length of Supreme Court opinions
may be due, in part, to the increase in concurring and dissenting opinions).
63. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
64. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60.
65. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60 (providing word counts for books in the
Bible).
66. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60.
67. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60.
68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See also author¶s table from page 10.
69. Word counts were either obtained via Hawthorn Mineart¶s Word Counts of Famous Short
Stories, COMMONPLACEBOOK (Jan. 22, 2012), http://commonplacebook.com/writing/word-counts-offamous-short-stories/ [https://perma.cc/B2EX-LDA8] or by this author¶s downloading the original
short story and performing a computer-assisted word count.
70. Id.
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Consuming a controversial case, however, such as Obergefell v. Hodges71
ZRXOG GHPDQG WKH OLWHUDU\ DWWHQWLRQ RI 6KLUOH\ -DFNVRQ¶s The Lottery (3,773
words); -DFN/RQGRQ¶VTo Build a Fire (7,176); 2¶+HQU\¶VThe Gift of the Magi
  0DUN 7ZDLQ¶V The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County
 ZRUGV  (GJDU $OODQ 3RH¶V The Tell-Tale Heart (2,093); Frank
6WRFNWRQ¶V The Lady or the Tiger   DQG $QWRQ &KHNKRY¶V The Bet
(2,871).72
Obergefell, at just over 24,000 words, is only half the length of the Roberts
&RXUW¶V 6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW FDVHV District of Columbia v. Heller73 (50,870
words) and McDonald v. Chicago74 (58,597 words). To cover cases of this
OHQJWKUHTXLUHVWKHUHDGLQJHTXLYDOHQWRI:DVKLQJWRQ,UYLQJ¶V The Legend of
Sleepy Hollow (29,280 ZRUGV )6FRWW)LW]JHUDOG¶VBabylon Revisited (7,433
ZRUGV (UQHVW+HPLQJZD\¶VThe Snows of Kilimanjaro (42,630 words); and
'+/DZUHQFH¶VThe Rocking-Horse Winner (9,150 words).75
Thus, when teaching the two modern Second Amendment cases and the
same-sex marriage case, a Constitutional Law professor must acknowledge that
she is teaching the equivalent of an upper-level English literature course. What
college students study over a semester, law students must learn over days. This
is a heavy pedagogical lift.
([FHVVLYHRSLQLRQOHQJWK³KDVWKHSUDFWLFDOHIIHFWHYHQLIQRWLQWHQGHGRI
removing the opinions from the scrutiny of the governed. The excessive length
has the effect of anesthetizing the reader. The needless verbosity not only
VHUYHVWRFRQIXVHWKHUHDGHULWDOVRPDNHWKHWDVNWRRWLPHFRQVXPLQJ´ 76
Judge Abner Mikva observed that excessively long Supreme Court
RSLQLRQVKLQGHUOHJDOHGXFDWLRQ³,IZHWKLQNRIHGXFDWLRQLQWHUPVRIWKHODZ
school classroom, the disruptive effect of the epic opinion is quite clear. Close
DQDO\VLVRIMXGLFLDORSLQLRQVLVWKHFHQWHUSLHFHRIODZVFKRROVWXG\´77 The time
now required to consume and analyze these opinions is unnecessarily increased.
Further, because law school casebook editors publish heavily edited versions
of each case, chances increase that something important will be lost in studying
a case where lengthy portions have been removed during editing. It is
becoming increasingly difficult for professors, and casebook editors, to discern
the important messages from each case.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Mineart, supra note 69.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Mineart, supra note 69.
Forrester, supra note 30, at 177.
Mikva, supra note 38, at 1359.

2018]

SUPREME VERBOSITY

181

Constitutional law is not intended to emulate English literature courses. As
JustiFH+ROPHVUHPDUNHG³2IFRXUVHWKHODZLVQRWWKHSODFHIRUWKHDUWLVWRU
WKHSRHW7KHODZLVWKHFDOOLQJRIWKLQNHUV´78
Yet, the justices appear not to have received this message. Instead, judges,
in writing for too many people, write too much.79 ³>7]hese twin defects feed
on each other. An important consequence of this problem is the disruption of
the educational process as it unfolds not only in the law school classroom, but
in the larger world of legal practitioners, and in the still larger realm of informed
FLWL]HQV´80 Judicial opinions are not intended to be great literary works. While
some enjoy the clever, albeit professorial, writing of modern justices, many
wish the Supreme Court would revert back to simply saying what the law is.
Consuming a case involving important constitutional rights should not require
WKHVWXG\DQGDWWHQWLRQRIDIUHVKPDQ(QJOLVKOLWHUDWXUHFRXUVH³>7@KHSUDFWLFDO
result of such long and involved opinions is that few people are likely to read
WKHP´81
VI. THE SEARCH FOR CLARITY AND CONCISION
Unfortunately, bad decisions seem to coincide all too often with opinions
of excessive length.82
From guns to gay marriage, the Roberts Court has taken opinion writing to
a new level. This new level is increasing costs and sowing confusion. Lawyers
must read longer opinions and sift through multiple, individually drafted
ZULWLQJVLQVHDUFKRIWKH&RXUW¶VKROGLQJ'RHVWKLVFRQFXUUHQFHDGGDQ\WKLQJ"
Is this lengthy dissent evidence of what is to come²or, merely evidence of
what the dissenters wish had happened? Lawyers, and law students, are reading
Supreme Court opinions that often lack clarity and concision.
Constitutional standards of review are no longer obvious. Take Obergefell
v. Hodges for example. The justices wrote five separate opinions totaling
approximately 24,000 words.83 Critics were unsure whether the Court decided
the case on Equal Protection grounds or substantive due process.84 At a recent
Constitutional Law Scholars Forum, a panel discussing Obergefell lamented its

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Frankfurter, supra note 56, at 211.
Mikva, supra note 38, at 1369.
Id.
Forrester, supra note 30, at 177.
Id.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Penrose, supra note 5.
Penrose, supra note 5.
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lack of clarity.85 One presenter indicated he had to read the opinion multiple
times to discern its meaning.86 The dissenting opinions offered little respite.
The dissenters²and all four dissenting justices authored individual opinions²
used their writing to chastise the majority, cast pejoratives, and lament the end
of our democracy.87 The tone was overtly personal and hyperbolic, an approach
prohibited when filing briefs with the Supreme Court.88 The five opinions
require a serious time investment yet provide scant legal guidance.
District of Columbia v. Heller fares no better.89 This Second Amendment
case intentionally fails to set forth a governing constitutional standard of
review.90 Is the majority relying upon strict scrutiny, since we are dealing with
an enumerated right, or something else? While Justice Scalia liberally, and
appropriately, criticized the Obergefell majority for creating what appears to be
a fundamental right but failing to use the traditional constitutional standard of
strict scrutiny review, his Heller majority commits the identical error.91 Heller
finds self-GHIHQVHLQWKHKRPHWREHWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHSURWHFWLRQ
but fails to explain why many disfavored individuals, including convicted nonviolent felons, fall outside this protection.92 Justice Scalia explains that there
are longstanding legal prohibitions precluding ownership by such individuals,
but fails to cite a single source.93 Heller¶V IDLOXUH WR FODULI\ WKH GHSWK DQG
breadth of our Second Amendment rights is why tangential issues keep coming

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626±43. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and
Justice Scalia all filed individual dissenting opinions.
88. See SUP. CT. R. 24.
89. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
90. Id. at 628±29.
91. Id. Rather than provide an applicable constitutional level of scrutiny, Justice Scalia¶s
majority opinion states: ³Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights, banning from the home µthe most preferred firearm in the nation to µkeep¶ and use
for protection of one¶s home and family,¶ would fail constitutional muster.´ Id. (internal citation and
footnote omitted). Footnote 27 within this quote challenges Justice Breyer¶s dissenting approach using
rational basis review. But, such argument²placed in a footnote no less²is hardly adequate to advise
litigants and legislators of the governing constitutional standard of review.
92. Id. at 626±27.
93. Id. Justice Scalia¶s exact quote reads: ³Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.´ Id. And, while Justice
Scalia provides a footnote at the end of this statement, the footnote¶s content provides commentary
rather than sourcing²³We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples;
our list does not purport to be exhaustive.´Id. at 627 n.26.
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before the Supreme Court.94 Unfortunately, since McDonald, the Court has
provided little guidance.
Heller and Obergefell, and the numerous dissents attached to both opinions,
fail the test of Supreme Court Rule 14.4. Neither case was concise. Neither
was clear. Both add great length to the U.S. Reports without adding equal
YDOXH%RWKRIIHUD³TXLFN-IL[´IRUDFRPSOLFDWHGSUREOHP$QGLQGRLQJVR
both offer more confusion than guidance. The only thing certain about either
opinion is that decided matters are far from resolved.
3URIHVVRU %U\DQ *DUQHU¶V XVHIXO WH[W Plain English for Lawyers, gives
simple advice for better writing. Most of his recommended tools were absent
in both Heller and Obergefell. In fact, most of his tips seem ignored altogether
at the highest Court. Why would the justices eschew the very writing approach
they crave as readers? The Supreme Court Rules demanding brevity and clarity
seem to capture many sage writing tips:
1. Use simple, commonly understood words;95
2. Eliminate adjectives and adverbs;
3. Omit needless words;96
4. Eliminate unnecessary footnotes;97 and,
5. Limit sentence and paragraph length;98
Good writing techniques yield clearer and more concise writing. It is the
writing approach I teach²DQGVWULYHWRHPXODWH,GRQ¶WDOZD\VVXFFHHG%XW
I always keep these thoughts in mind. Consider the reader. Make their job
easier. Eliminate verbal clutter. Keep it simple.
94. E.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 945 (2018)
LQYROYLQJ&DOLIRUQLD¶VWHQGD\ZDLWLQJSHULRGWRSXUFKDVHILUHDUPV  Peruta v. California, 824 F.3d
919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (concerning whether an individual has a
lawful right to carry firearms in public for self-defense); Norman v. Florida, 215 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (involving the right to openly carry firearms); Kolbe v. Hogan, (4th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (involving the right to own semiautomatic rifles and
magazines).
95. GARNER, supra note 2, at 44±65; see also Rachel Clark Hughey, Age-Old ABCs of Writing
Applied to the Law: Accuracy, Brevity, and Clarity, 59 THE FED. LAW., June 2012, at 4, 5 (attributing
the following to Hippocrates: ³The chief virtue that language can have is clearness, and nothing
detracts from it so much as the use of unfamiliar words.´ 
96. GARNER, supra note 2, at 24±27. Apparently, Professor Garner was channeling his innerThomas Jefferson in doing so, as Rachel Clark Hughey attributes Jefferson as saying, ³The most
valuable of all talents is that of never using two words when one will do.´ Clark Hughey, supra note
95, at 4; see also ALDISERT, supra note 3, at 274.
97. See Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647, 647 (1985); Jack
Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 276 (1989) (reminding that an argument that ³places
too much of its substantive argument in the footnote was probably not well organized or well written
in the first place´).
98. GARNER, supra note 2, at 27±31, 88±92.
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$IWHUVWXG\LQJ3URIHVVRU*DUQHU¶VWH[W,FKDOOHQJHGP\VWXGHQWVWRUHGUDIW
any of the individual opinions in Heller or Obergefell in the spirit of Rule 14.4.
The assignment required that each opinion retain the voice and holding of the
Court, or individual Justice, but be cut in length by two-thirds. The results were
amazing. The students excelled. And, the opinions became clearer and more
concise. To demonstrate the ease of redrafting these opinions presenting only
WKHUHOHYDQWSRLQWVUDLVHGLQHDFKFDVH,KDYHDWWDFKHGRQHRIP\VWXGHQW¶VZRUN
(with her permission) in Appendix A.99 As her work shows, even controversial
opinions become less objectionable once they become understandable.
The Roberts Court needs to reassess its writing. Lengthy opinions are not
a new phenomenon.100 Lawyers have been complaining for years about opinion
length.101 Yet, opinions keep growing and growing.102 Empirically, the Roberts
Court has achieved a new benchmark. Its opinion averages are the lengthiest
in Court history²by a wide and growing margin. I have attached as Appendix
%DFKDUWOLVWLQJDOOWKH5REHUWV&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQs with word counts over 20,000
words.103 This appendix allows readers to appreciate the expanding verbal
legacy of the Roberts Court.
:LWKRXWGLPLQLVKLQJWKH&RXUW¶VUROHRUGLVSDUDJLQJDQ\RIWKHMXVWLFHVP\
research suggests the justices spend inadequate time editing their work. How
is it possible that dissenting and concurring opinions are frequently lengthier
than the majority opinion? Why are there no governing limitations, or selfimposed restraints on opinion length? When will the Court set the example as
writers they demand as readers?
, SURSRVH WKH WLPH LV QRZ  /HW¶V IDFH LW ³>H@DV\ UHDGLQJ LV GDPQ KDUG
ZULWLQJ´104
VII. THE PROPOSAL
The short opinion would seem to be the better vehicle for conveying
jurisprudence to farther distances. Short opinions are more easily and
generally read than are the longer ones. The affection of the American people
for short movie newsreels, crisp radio broadcasts, pictorial essays, novelettes

99. Jordan Curry, J.D. Candidate Class of 2019, Texas A&M School of Law.
100. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 60.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Research Chart prepared by Lindsay Willeford, J.D. 2017, Texas A&M School of Law.
104. Hughey, supra note 95, at 5 (attributing this quote to Nathaniel Hawthorne).
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and tabloid newspapers, weekly-condensed news magazines and readers’
digests, certifies a universal demand for brevity in a swift-moving age.105
The swift-moving age described above was the mid-twentieth century. The
twenty-first century edition would agree that short opinions reach wider
audiences. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat have taken the place of
³VKRUWPRYLHQHZVUHHOV´DQG³UHDGHUV¶GLJHVWV´%UHYLW\FRPELQHGZLWKLQVWDQW
access, is a thoroughly modern value. Our President communicates via Twitter.
We receive legal and political news from social media. Despite the vintage
UHIHUHQFHWR³WDEORLGQHZVSDSHUV´-XVWLFH0DUWLQ¶VPessage is as timely today
DVZKHQLWZDVILUVWZULWWHQ7KHVKRUWRSLQLRQVWLOODSSHDUVWREH³WKHEHWWHU
YHKLFOH´IRUWKH&RXUWWRFRPPXQLFDWHLWVZRUN5HDGHUVZKDWHYHUGUDZVWKHLU
LQWHUHVWWRWKH&RXUW¶VZRUNGRQRWZDQWWKHLULQIRUPDWLRQOLWWHUHGZith lengthy
citations, difficult language, and public conversations between the justices
played out in seriatim opinions. Readers simply want to know what the law is.
Americans, in particular, want to understand their legal rights. Do gays
have a constitutional right to marry? Does the Constitution protect the right to
possess a handgun or an assault rifle? Can the government force me to buy
health insurance? Can the government track my movements by using my cell
SKRQH¶V LQFLGHQWDO FRQWDFWV ZLWK FHll towers as I drive? These are critical
matters for many Americans. The Court owes us clarity in announcing our
rights. What, exactly does the Constitution say about these things²and other
PDWWHUVWKDWKDYHQ¶W\HWFRPHWRRXUDWWHQWLRQ? The justices have an obligation
to tell us²briefly.
I propose the justices live by the rules they have established for litigants.
The justices should be held to the same maximum length requirements in their
opinions required in our briefs. We all share a disdain for long, confusing legal
prose. We all need clarity in the law. And, brevity often brings clarity along
as its companion.
With seriatim opinions spanning 20,000 to 40,000 words, and majority
opinions averaging 8,500 words for the past five terms, the Court has to set a
limit upon itself. Majority opinions should be capped at the same length as
petitions for certiorari. This would require the justices to work as hard on their
writing as they do on reaching their decision. This would eliminaWHWKH³ODZ
UHYLHZLWLV´²the urge to cite every matter that touches an issue, usually
resulting in vast overwriting²that young law clerks bring to chambers. This
would require the justices to live up to their own standards of accuracy, brevity,
and clarity.
105. John D. Martin, The Problem of Reducing the Volume of Published Opinions, J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC¶Y, Feb. 1943, at 138, 141.
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The Supreme Court Rules already address opinions. Rule 41 requires the
Clerk of Court release opinions, initially in slip form.106 Why not add a Rule
that limits the length of these opinions? Why not add a Rule that limits the
number of concurrences and dissents to a particular case? Why not formalize
the elimination of seriatim opinions by limiting the total length of an opinion²
absent extenuating circumstances²to 9,000 total words? The Court already
has a system in place to grant litigants extensions in arguments.107 A rule can
be crafted giving the same, exceptional relief to the Court. There are few cases
that cannot be communicated more concisely than they are now. Simple cases
should yield simple opinions. Complicated cases might yield longer opinions
but not every case is complicated. The Roberts Court invests far too much
energy in obiter dictum. The point is to say what the law is²not what it ought
to be. Worse still, an opinion is no occasion to undermine the integrity of the
Court or its members.
Placing word limits on the Court presents a workable solution. The justices
control their docket, their chambers, and their law clerks. They also control the
rules they are willing to abide by. If I am limited in the words I can use to
communicate my case²a case sufficiently important that I sought an audience
before the CRXQWU\¶VKLJKHVWWULEXQDO²the Court should be similarly limited.
Our words should be of equal value. After all, the Court has the benefit of a
parsed down record, case law presented through briefing, and on occasion, oral
argument. In fact, the justices decide whether to schedule oral argument, which
provides them even greater opportunity to marshal the facts and law, if
unclear.108
The justices should welcome this limitation in the same way that lawyers
welcome word limits. At some point, every lawyer must be able to succinctly
discuss her case. This task, requiring the sharp editorial tool of summarizing,
would be a welcome addition to judicial opinions. In an era where it is all too
HDV\WROLWHUDOO\³FXWDQGSDVWH´SDVVDJHVLQEULHIVRUSDVWFDVHVWKHLQWHOOHFWXDO
task of editing²left unchecked²goes unpracticed. Computers and the
comforts of modern legal research enable the Court to write and write and write
and write, without exerting much physical effort. This contrasts with the days
of past justices who either wrote in longhand or used actual typewriters. The
cases they referenced were in a literal library, not on their cell phones. The
important passage in a case could not be found through computerized assistance
but required one to pour over the pages. No wonder opinions were short. The
job of legal research was exhausting. And, writing was no easier.
106. SUP. CT. R. 41.
107. SUP. CT. R. 28.3.
108. SUP. CT. R. 28.
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Today, writing is easier²physically, intellectually, and technologically.
%XWWKHMXVWLFHV¶ZRUGVFDUU\LPSRUWDQWZHLJKW7KH\PXVWWDNHPRUHFDUHLQ
putting those words on paper. Their words matter. The justices should
approach writing with the understanding that what they seek as readers, we seek
as readers. In law, time literally is money. Time spent reading unnecessarily
long cases is misspent time. Instead, the justices should invest their time in
editing and crafting a product that is accessible. With the technological
advancements of the 21st century, accessibility means more than merely the
ability to find the law. One must be able to understand the law.
VIII. IN CONCLUSION, LET ME BE BRIEF109
Supreme Court opinions in recent years increasingly have become
exercises in individual argumentation and advocacy on the part of the several
justices. The [Roberts] Court has given new meaning to the word “opinion.”110
Intractable problems are hard to solve. The issue of long, complicated legal
opinions goes back a full century. What began as a call for reform from
³OHQJWK\´ five to six-page opinions has morphed into a prayer against short
novels. The return to seriatim opinions occurred even as Chief Justice Roberts
heralded a return to consensus. It turns out, the Supreme Court mirrors the
division in our country. But, must it also mirror the divisive discourse and
constant argument? Must everyone have their individual say²the ubiquitous,
Can I finish?
Now is a time for leadership at the Court, not individuality. The justices
must lead our legal community. In doing so, they will help lead our nation.
Future discussions should focus on the proliferation of separate opinions. For
now, if the justices would curb their prose, all would benefit. Supreme Court
opinions are legal pronouncements. They are the written response to legal
³FDVHVDQGFRQWURYHUVLHV´111 They should not rival novellas or transform into
SHUVRQDO VSHHFKHVDERXWWKH &RXUW¶VUROHLQ VRFLHW\ 7KH\ VKRXOG QRWVRXQG
political or ideological. The justices should focus on the law. Their writing
would benefit. Society would benefit.

109. #irony. It is hard to defend the use of footnotes for substantive discussion²such as why
an essay on verbosity needs 8,500 words. But I will try. This essay is intended as both a research tool
and a proposal for clearer, concise judicial opinions. It provides references for those working toward
reform and charts a course for further study. This is also the average length of a Roberts Court majority
opinion.
110. Forrester, supra note 30, at 182.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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To achieve concision, the justices should voluntarily agree to adopt the
same word length limitations the Court imposes on litigants. They should set
the example. They should show us what good legal writing looks like by
sticking to the issues, writing clearly, and saying only what needs to be said.
They should consider their own observations about legal writing: no one ever
looked at a lengthy opinion and said, I wish that had been longer.
As accessibility to Supreme Court opinions improves, the justices should
expect their writing to become more universally consumed. Their audience is
worldwide²available on every iPhone, every tablet, and every computer.
Their writing should reflect this advancement. More importantly, their writing
VKRXOGUHIOHFWWKHLULQVWLWXWLRQDOSRVLWLRQ2XU)RXQGHUVJDYHXV³RQH6XSUHPH
&RXUW´112 7KDW&RXUWKDVDVROHPQGXW\WR³VD\ZKDWWKHODZLV´,WQRWWKH\
should do so in a manner we can all understand.
Now is the time. Just ask the justices.

112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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APPENDIX A
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases come to us from the States of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union between one man and one
woman. See Mich. Const., Art. I, § 25; Ky. Const. § 233A; Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 18. Petitioners are
fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased,
and respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in
question. The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Substantive Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the right to marry or
have their marriages, lawfully performed in another state, given full
recognition.
Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home
states, and each District Court ruled in their favor. Respondents appealed the
decisions against them to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. It consolidated
the cases and reversed the judgments of the district courts holding that a state
has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages or to recognize
same-sex marriages performed out of state. We reverse.
The issues before the Court are (1) whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex and (2) whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize a same-sex marriage
licensed and performed in a State which does grant that right. We answer each
inquiry in the affirmative.
I
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
VWDWHVKDOO³GHSULYHDQ\SHUVRQRIOLIHOLEHUW\RUSURSHUW\ZLWKRXWGXHSURFHVV
RIODZ´7KHIXQGDPHQWDOOLEHUWLHVSURWHFWHGE\WKLVFODXVHLQFOXGHPRVWRIWKH
rights in the Bill of Rights, and extend also to certain personal choices central
to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define
personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1968) (holding the right to obtain contraceptives, married or single, is
fundamental). Further, identification of fundamental rights requires courts to
exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so
fundamental that the state must accord them its respect. Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). History and tradition guide this
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inquiry, but do not set its outer boundaries. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
572 (2003). In other words, historical and traditional factors are to be
considered in defining whether a right is fundamental, but are not always
dispositive.
The right to marry is protected by the Constitution. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Loving invalidated bans on interracial unions holding
PDUULDJHLV³RQHRIWKHYLWDOSHUVRQDOUights essential to the orderly pursuit of
KDSSLQHVVE\IUHHPHQ´Id. This fundamental right to marriage was reaffirmed
WKURXJKWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVWKDWIROORZHGSee, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (holding the right to marry was burdened by a law
prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (holding the right to marry was abridged by
regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry).
Today the Court finds the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples as opposite-sex
couples. The Court bases its conclusion on four principles.
First, the right to marry is fundamental because the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
This is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process
Clause²choices concerning marriage, namely who to marry, are among the
PRVW LQWLPDWH D SHUVRQ FDQ PDNH  ,QGHHG LW ZRXOG EH FRQWUDGLFWRU\ ³WR
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the
IDPLO\LQRXUVRFLHW\´Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. The nature of marriage is
that, through its enduring bond, two persons can find other freedoms, such as
expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, no matter
their sexual orientation.
Second, the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a twoperson union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.
7KLV&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHKDVUHFRJQL]HGWKHLQWLPDWHDVVRFLDWLRQSURWHFWHGE\
this right. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 95±96.
As the court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as
opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association. It does not follow that the
freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not
achieve the full promise of liberty.
Third, the right to marry is fundamental because marriage safeguards
children and families and thus draws a meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925). The Court has recognized these connections by describing
this gURXSRIULJKWVDVDXQLILHGZKROH³>7@KHULJKWWRµPDUU\HVWDEOLVKDKRPH
DQG EULQJ XS FKLOGUHQ¶ LV D FHQWUDO SDUW RI WKH OLEHUW\ SURWHFWHG E\ WKH 'XH
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3URFHVV&ODXVH´Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. Marriage also confers benefits to
children by allowing thHPWR³XQGHUVWDQGWKHLQWHJULW\DQGFORVHQHVVRIWKHLU
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their
GDLO\ OLYHV´  Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694±95 (2013).
Marriage also affords the permanency and stabilLW\LPSRUWDQWWRFKLOGUHQ¶VEHVW
interests. Without this permanency and stability, the children of same-sex
couples would suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.
These intangible injuries do not exist alone, however. There are significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents. For example, drawing on
the factual scenario of one of the couples involved in this very case, in a state
that only allows for opposite sex couples or single persons to adopt a child, a
FKLOG¶V³SDUHQW´PD\ILQGKLPRUKHUVHOIZLWKQROHJDOULJKWVRYHUDFKLOGKHRU
she has raised if tragedy were to befall the true adoptive parent. Further, in
such a state, schools and hospitals may treat children of same-sex couples,
having been only legally adopted by one of the parents, as only having that one
parent ignoring the nonadoptive parent who has also raised the child. Excluding
same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the
right to marry²the safeguarding of children and family.
)RXUWKWKLV&RXUW¶VFDVHVDQGWKHQDWLRQ¶VWUDGLWLRQVPDNHLWFOHDUWKDW
PDUULDJHLVDNH\VWRQHRIRXUVRFLDORUGHU0DUULDJHKDVORQJEHHQ³DJUHDW
SXEOLFLQVWLWXWLRQJLYLQJFKDUDFWHUWRRXUZKROHFLYLOSROLW\´Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). This is evidenced by the varying, but great list of
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities conferred upon married
couples by their State. Thus, the States have contributed to the fundamental
character of the marriage right by placing it at the center of so many facets of
the legal and social order. There is no difference between same and oppositesex couples with respect to this principle, yet by exclusion from that institution,
same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that states have linked
to marriage. Exclusion from the status that States attach more and more
significance to teaches that same-sex couples are unequal in important respects.
The Court therefore finds the fundamental right to marry applies to
same-sex couples in the same way it does to opposite-sex couples.
II
Respondents raise several arguments urging the opposite conclusion as
is reached here, and the Court addresses some of those arguments in turn,
finding after consideration that the remainder have no merit.
First, respondents note the history of marriage as between a man and a
woman, and that fact should be dispositive in this case. But this argument
ignores the rule set out above, that history and tradition is not always dispositive
in determining whether a right is fundamental. Further, the idea of marriage
has changed over time²history is ever-evolving. For example, marriage used

192

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:167

WR EH DUUDQJHG E\ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SDUHQWV EXW QRZ LV D FRQVHQVXDO XQLRQ
Additionally, marriage has evolved as the status of woman has changed.
Marriage is no longer defined as a male-dominated legal entity as it was in the
recent past. These changes deeply transformed the structure of marriage, and
affected aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential. Therefore, as
has happened in the past, the structure of marriage can change again, and
continue to transform as our society does.
Not only has marriage, as an institution, transformed over time, but the
rights of gays and lesbians have as well. For example, in the past, gays and
lesbians were prohibited from most government employment and barred from
military service, but that is no longer the case. They used to be excluded from
immigration law and targeted by the police. Being gay or lesbian used to be
deemed a mental disorder, but now is known to be immutable. Further, samesex intimacy used to be outlawed, but is now protected. States all over the
country have begun to allow same-sex marriage as protected under their own
constitutions. The Defense of Marriage Act, defining marriage as between a
man and a woman, was invalidated, and the Federal Government now
recognizes lawful same-sex marriages.
Further, the petitioners acknowledge the history of marriage, but
contend that the history contributes to their desire to marry. It is the enduring
LPSRUWDQFH RI PDUULDJH WKDW XQGHUOLHV WKH SHWLWLRQHUV¶ GHVLUH WR KDYH WKHLU
marriage licensed or recognized²their respect and need for its privilege and
responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is
their only real path to profound commitment.
Second, respondents argue that petitioners are not asserting an existing
fundamental right²the right to marry. Rather, they are asserting a new and
nonexistent right to same-sex marriage. In support of this argument,
respondents cite Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) which
FDOOHGIRUD³FDUHIXOGHVFULSWLRQ´RIIXQGDPHntal rights.
However, Glucksberg is not among and is not consistent with the vast
jurisprudence this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights. All
relevant precedent refers to the right to marry in its comprehensive sense rather
WKDQWKH³ULJKWWRLQWHUUDFLDOPDUULDJH´ Loving), ³ULJKWRIIDWKHUVZLWKXQSDLG
FKLOG VXSSRUW WR PDUU\´ Zablocki  RU ³WKH ULJKW RI DQ LQPDWH WR PDUU\´
(Turner). Nothing in our jurisprudence, therefore, should cause us to define the
right at issue in this case as ³WKHULJKWRIVDPH-VH[FRXSOHVWRPDUU\´)XUWKHU
Glucksberg is distinguishable from the instant case, as it dealt with physicianassisted suicide rather than marriage.
Third, respondents argue there has been a lack of diplomatic discourse
required to decide an issue so basic as the definition of marriage. In other
words, respondents argue that such a decision should be left for the legislature

2018]

SUPREME VERBOSITY

193

to decide. But this Court does not have to wait for legislative action to correct
a constitutional transgression. Indeed, when the rights of persons are violated,
DVLVWKHFDVHKHUH³WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQrequires UHGUHVVE\WKHFRXUWV´Schuette
v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1626 (2014) (emphasis added). The dynamic of our
constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative action before
asserting a fundamental right.
III
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition,
but rights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains
urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach
that conclusion based on religious or philosophical premises, which are not
disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted
law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of
the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose
own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in
marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.
The Court now holds that same sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry. Today this Court overrules decisions inconsistent with this
opinion. The state laws challenged by petitioners in these cases are now held
invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. And if states are required
by the Constitution to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the
justifications for refusing to recognize those marriages performed elsewhere are
undermined. Therefore, this Court holds there is no lawful basis for a state to
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on
the ground of its same-sex character.
Reversed.
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